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ABSTRACT 
 
Electrical Characterization of Arcing Fault Behavior on 120/208V Secondary Networks.  
(December 2011) 
Jeffrey Alan Wischkaemper, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. B. Don Russell 
 
 Arcing faults have been a persistent problem on power systems for over one 
hundred years, damaging equipment and creating safety hazards for both utility 
personnel and the public. On low-voltage secondary networks, arcing faults are known 
to cause specific hazards collectively called “manhole events”, which include smoke and 
fire in underground structures, and in extreme cases explosions. This research provides 
the first comprehensive attempt to electrically characterize naturally occurring arcing 
fault behavior on 120/208V secondary networks. 
 Research was performed in conjunction with the Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York, whereby a single low-voltage network was instrumented with thirty high-
speed, high-fidelity data recording devices. For a nominal one year period, these devices 
collected detailed, high-speed waveform recordings of arcing faults and other system 
transients, as well as statistical power system data, offering new insights into the 
behavior of arcing faults on low-voltage networks.  
  Data obtained in this project have shown the intensity, persistence, and 
frequency of arcing faults on low-voltage networks to be much higher than commonly 
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believed. Results indicate that arcing faults may persist on a more-or-less continuous 
basis for hours without self-extinguishing, may recur over a period of hours, days, or 
weeks without generating enough physical evidence to be reported by the public or 
operate conventional protective devices, and may draw enough current to be observed at 
the primary substation serving the network. Additionally, simultaneous fault current 
measurements recorded at multiple locations across the network suggest the possibility 
of using multi-point secondary monitoring to detect and locate arcing faults before they 
cause a manhole event. 
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DEDICATION 
 
dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona 
et lux in tenebris lucet et tenebrae eam non conprehenderunt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO LOW-VOLTAGE ARCING PROBLEM 
 
1.1  Historical Background 
Arcing faults have been a persistent problem since the construction of the first 
electrical power systems. Unlike bolted faults which usually trip protective devices, 
intermittent arcing faults may produce bursts of significant electrical activity interrupted 
by long quiescent periods (e.g. hours, days, weeks) before progressing to a sustained 
low-impedance, high-current electrical condition sufficient to operate a conventional 
protective device, or generating physical evidence to be noticed by the public. When 
incipient arcing conditions go undetected, they pose a variety of problems for system 
operators, as well as a safety hazard to utility crews and the public. 
A significant body of work exists exploring detection of arcing on medium and 
high-voltage systems [1-75]. Recent years have seen an increasing interest in arcing on 
low-voltage (<1,000V) systems, but this work is almost exclusively focused on 480V 
[76-85] systems, where arcing faults can both readily sustain themselves, and produce 
fires, explosions, and arcs with a tremendous release of energy. Very little work has been 
done on faulted 120/208V class systems, partially because conventional wisdom has 
always held that arcing faults cannot sustain themselves at such a low-voltage level [83, 
86-90].  
____________ 
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The lack of significant research on 120/208V class systems does not mean the 
problem is entirely unknown. Early published papers on arcing in low-voltage networks 
date to 1924 [91], followed by two papers in 1931 [86, 87]. The next mentions of arcing 
on low-voltage networks in published literature comes almost two decades later in the 
classic Westinghouse text [88], and the Edison Electric Company’s reference on 
underground systems [89]. All of these early documents express the same basic 
conclusion: arcing at 120/208V does not sustain itself, and cables on such systems, when 
properly designed, should burn themselves clear in relatively short order. In general, 
these books still form the foundation of conventional wisdom related to arcing faults on 
120/208V networks: arcing faults typically clear themselves “with relatively low 
current,” “without damage to the cable except at the fault,” and “in less than a tenth of a 
second”[88, 89].  
Following the Edison Electric book, little mention is made of low-voltage 
network arcing until 1983, when a paper discussing the protection of Vepco’s 480V spot 
networks was published by Roop [92]. Koch and Carpentier published a work detailing 
manhole explosions caused by arcing faults on BC Hydro’s 480V networks in 1992 [93], 
and a 1993 paper focused on the detection of high impedance faults on low-voltage 
networks in laboratory tests [90]. Again, sustained arcing on 120/208V class systems 
was not discussed, or when discussed, was declared to not be possible. 
In spite of the theoretical objections and conventional wisdom to the contrary, the 
experience of personnel operating 120/208V class systems indicated that significant 
arcing activity did exist on these systems, evidenced by substantial operational evidence. 
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 While researchers had not been successful at sustaining an arc at 120/208V in the 
laboratory, arcing faults certainly seemed to sustain themselves in conduits underground. 
Furthermore, the degradation of underground cables on 120/208V systems due to arcing 
produced smoke, fires, and explosions in underground structures, which collectively 
became known as “manhole events” [77, 90, 92-95].  
Even though arcing faults caused noticeable operational problems on 120/208V 
systems, understanding of the behavior of naturally occurring arcing phenomena at this 
voltage level was not significantly different in 1994 than when the first underground 
alternating current networks were installed almost 100 years before. Several factors 
contributed to this general lack of understanding.  
First, underground low-voltage arcing is an intermittent phenomenon, the 
occurrence of which is almost impossible to predict. As a result, recording current and 
voltage measurements produced by naturally occurring arcing events is a non-trivial 
task. Any experiment would need to monitor multiple points on the secondary network 
for a period of weeks or months to have a high probability of detecting a naturally 
occurring arcing fault. Additionally, arcing faults often have magnitudes equal to or less 
than normal system transients, meaning any device set sensitively enough to record 
incipient arcing signatures will also record large numbers of non-arcing events, creating 
a significant data storage and data management problem. Also, because arcing faults can 
endure over a period of minutes to hours, properly characterizing them requires a data 
collection device capable of recording long waveform files, on the order of minutes, a 
feature not typically available on even exotic relays or power quality devices. 
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Second, as documented in literature, attempts to induce arcing at 120/208V in laboratory 
settings proved elusive. It was clear arcing occurred in underground structures and 
persisted at least long enough to produce serious physical damage, but replicating this 
phenomenon in the laboratory was very difficult. The physical conditions which enabled 
arcing in underground conduits was unknown, and by the time a major arcing event was 
reported, all evidence of those conditions had been obliterated by the event itself. 
Research conducted in [90] explains the difficulty of initiating arcing faults below 200V 
in a laboratory. It was not until a comprehensive study on gasses produced by the 
degradation of cable insulation that researchers were able to consistently produce stable 
arcs at 120V [96]. This study is discussed in detail in Section 2.1.1. 
Finally, even if one could model and understand the behavior of the naturally 
occurring phenomena, it was unclear how this knowledge would lead to improved 
system operation based on available technology. Even as recently as the last decade, 
following the report of [96], arcing faults were considered to be “an industry problem 
that presently has no available solution” [97]. Recent advances in distributed 
communication and intelligent relays have made systems for the detection and location 
of arcing faults on a secondary network technologically feasible, which in turn has 
generated new interest in research on this topic. Indeed, one of the recommendations of 
[96] was that such a system might be possible. In the years following this report, limited 
research has been published exploring this possibility [76, 81, 98]. These research efforts 
will be detailed in a subsequent section. 
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1.2  Low-voltage Networks 
 1.2.1  History 
The first low-voltage alternating current network is believed to have been 
installed in Memphis, TN in 1907, though this date is uncertain. It is clear, however, that 
by the early 1920’s, multiple networks existed in major cities across the United States. 
Due to perceived advantages including superior reliability and economic benefits serving 
dense urban loads, low-voltage networks became the de facto standard for any 
application where there was a high load density, or where high reliability was a 
requirement[88, 89]. By 1974, over 300 companies in the United States operated low-
voltage networks [99].  
Low-voltage networks remain a power delivery system of choice for urban 
centers today, with most major cities operating at least one network. Ironically, despite 
their widespread use, many utility personnel are unaware of their existence. When the 
subject is discussed, experienced personnel from utilities without operational networks 
are often surprised to learn that such systems exist. 
Functionally, low-voltage networks have experienced only incremental 
improvements since they were first installed. Their general topology and operation has 
remained relatively unchanged over the past 90 years, with the most major architectural 
advances being the introduction of the automatic network protector in 1924 [91], which 
served as the sine qua non of low-voltage networks, and the development of cable 
limiters to protect against fault currents in 1938 [100-103]. A variety of incremental 
changes have improved components like cable insulation, network transformers, and 
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network protector relays, but most networks operate today in more or less the same 
fashion as when they were first installed. Particularly telling is that the main reference 
texts in this field remain books published in the 1950’s, with low-voltage networks 
receiving only a passing mention in newer texts, if they are mentioned at all [88, 89, 
104]. 
 1.2.2  Typical Configuration 
 Low-voltage networks consist of a highly interconnected secondary cable system 
fed by multiple primary feeders. The network is structured in such a way that the 
secondary can be thought of as a more-or-less continuous “grid,” with each network 
transformer serving as a current injection point, and each load as a current sink. Network 
transformers are arranged in such a way that an outage on one primary feeder, even 
though it may take out several secondary transformers, does not result in an interruption 
in customer load. Likewise, the loss of a single secondary main cable does not result in 
the interruption of load to customers.  
A typical network protection scheme is as follows: in the event of a fault on a 
primary feeder, each network transformer is equipped with a network protector, which 
serves in essence as a circuit breaker that trips on reverse power flow [88, 89, 91]. If a 
fault is detected on a primary feeder, the substation breaker and all network protectors 
attached to transformers served by that feeder will open, de-energizing the circuit from 
both sides. In actual practice, the substation breaker will operate first, followed by 
network protectors tripping out based on their respective protection curves. After the 
substation breaker has opened, but before any network protectors have operated, the 
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network itself continues to feed the primary feeder fault from the secondary side. 
Initially, the primary fault will be fed from the network preferentially through secondary 
transformers electrically closest to the fault point, resulting in those transformers’ 
network protectors operating first. Once these network protectors have opened, the fault 
current shifts to flow through other transformers connected to the faulted primary feeder 
whose network protectors have not yet operated. This process continues until all network 
protectors on transformers connected to the affected feeder have operated. After 
operation of all protective devices, no intentional reclosing is attempted. The feeder 
remains out of service until the fault is located and repairs are complete. During the 
course of this research, several examples of this phenomenon were observed and 
recorded, enabling new insights into primary feeder fault behavior. 
Due to their low nominal voltage and high load density, low-voltage secondary 
networks are designed to carry relatively high currents. For example, a 120/208V 
1,000kVA transformer has a nominal per-phase current rating of over 2,600A at its 
secondary terminals at full rated load. These current levels require multiple, large 
diameter cables, and give rise to the possibility of unusually high fault currents. Typical 
numbers cited for available secondary fault currents are on the order of 35,000-50,000A. 
Because this fault current is served from multiple transformers, no single transformer 
sees the “total” fault current, making system protection a more challenging task. This 
problem is compounded during the occurrence of an arcing fault, which typically does 
not draw as much current as a full “bolted” fault. In foundational texts describing 
network operations, arcing faults are allowed to burn clear by design [88, 89]. A major 
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emphasis of good network design in these texts is making sure enough current is 
available to burn a cable clear in the event of an arcing fault at any point on the network. 
In essence, arcing faults that self-clear by burning free are a part of intended system 
operation, though the effects they cause are undesirable, often destructive and sometimes 
dangerous. 
Secondary transformer impedances in low-voltage networks are generally higher 
than those on medium voltage radial systems, with most units having 5% impedance [88, 
89]. This higher value prevents currents from “circulating” on primary feeders in normal 
system operation. In the absence of this artificially high impedance, current could flow 
from the network through the secondary transformer onto the primary feeder, and then 
back onto the secondary network through a different transformer attached to that primary 
feeder, under certain network load conditions. 
While some utilities employ SCADA-type systems on their secondary networks, 
in truth little is known about the actual behavior and distribution of current flows on 
secondary networks, both for loads and faults.  Conventional wisdom dictates that 
“every load (or every fault) is served by every transformer,” but few scientific 
measurements exist to provide a basis for modeling how load and fault current are 
distributed as a wide range of controlling parameters vary.  
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1.3  Low-voltage Arc Fault Problem 
 1.3.1  Evolution 
Arcing faults on 120/208V systems are known to cause a variety of operational 
and public safety hazards. Faults occur when cable insulation is sufficiently damaged to 
allow the formation of a conductive path between the phase conductor and a grounded or 
semi-grounded object. In general, this initial contact is not a “bolted” fault condition, but 
rather occurs through a high-impedance medium such as mud, water, slurry, etc. The 
resultant electrical current produces an arc, which in turn produces high temperatures 
and expulsion of gasses and metals, further degrading cable insulation, and increasing 
the probability of the fault continuing and/or recurring. Additionally, the localized 
heating, which has been measured to be several hundred degrees Celsius, liberates 
flammable, explosive, and toxic gases. Finally, the arc contains significant energy which 
by itself can produce powerful shockwaves [95, 105]. The calculation and mitigation of 
arc flash hazards is a problem affecting a wide range of industries, and is well 
documented in literature [105-121].  
1.3.2  Manhole Events 
Operational safety hazards produced by network arcing faults are commonly 
referred to as “manhole events.” This term serves as an omnibus phrase to describe a 
wide variety of phenomena which may evolve along different electrical and mechanical 
paths, but ultimately produce undesirable hazards to equipment, utility personnel, and 
the public. 
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The most serious categories of manhole events are fires and explosions. While 
manhole fires and explosions are not common, they have become increasingly damaging 
to utility public relations in an age where many passersby have the ability to video an 
explosion or fire occurring in a manhole or transformer vault and upload it to the internet 
before the utility is aware of the problem. A quick search of internet video sites reveals 
no shortage of footage related to manhole events. While the public is unaware of and 
unconcerned with the mechanism causing these events, they are generally quite 
concerned with the end result. In addition to exposure on social networking and internet 
video sites, major events also tend to draw the attention of larger news outlets. Figure 1 
shows a photo published on the New York Times website on February 11, 2010 
following an event which damaged a building in downtown Manhattan. A similar photo, 
published on the social media site Gawker, is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: Explosion in a transformer vault, February 11, 2010.  
Photo by Stephanie Derogue for the New York Times 
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Figure 2: Photo of February 11, 2010 manhole explosion.  
Photo by Austin Riggs, published on Gawker 
 
 
The degradation of cable insulation produces a wide range of flammable and 
explosive gasses, as described in [96]. These gasses are produced at the point of the 
fault. When the fault occurs in conduit, explosive gasses are believed to constitute a low 
fire and explosion risk, at least initially, primarily due to the lack of oxygen in the 
immediate area surrounding the fault. Over time, the gasses are believed to migrate out 
of the conduit into adjacent structures, mixing with oxygen. When the proper ratio of 
oxygen and explosive gasses combine, additional arcing may trigger a fire or explosion. 
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Even in the absence of explosive gasses, the shockwave from the arc itself can, in some 
instances, be enough to displace manhole covers[95]. 
Insulation degradation can also produce significant amounts of smoldering and 
smoke, which can sometimes be visible emerging from structures. These events are 
generally referred to as “smoking manholes,” and are significantly more common than 
manhole fires and explosions. Without swift attention, however, a smoking manhole 
may escalate into a more serious event. Additionally, the composition of gasses 
produced by degrading insulation may contain compounds like hydrogen chloride and 
sulfur dioxide which are toxic, especially when inhaled. 
A subcategory of manhole event not generally seen or discussed in literature is 
the presence of elevated carbon monoxide in structures or buildings. Carbon monoxide is 
produced when carbon-containing material combust without sufficient oxygen to 
completely oxidize the organic material. Carbon monoxide is a known product of arcing 
fault-induced insulation degradation, and poses perhaps the greatest safety risk to the 
public [96]. Carbon monoxide is odorless, colorless, and tasteless, but also extremely 
flammable and highly toxic. As a result, any report of an elevated carbon monoxide level 
in a building or structure is generally investigated by the utility and considered a 
manhole event for the purposes of internal reporting. 
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2. DISCUSSION OF RECENT WORK ON 120/208V ARCING 
 
2.1  Prior Work by the Consolidated Edison Company of New York 
 2.1.1  1996 EPRI/UL Gas Evaluation Study  
 2.1.1.1 Summary of Results 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEdison) is the largest 
domestic operator of low-voltage secondary network power systems. Recognizing the 
significance of manhole events, ConEdison contracted with EPRI in 1995 to conduct 
research on the low-voltage arcing phenomenon, targeting systems operating at less than 
480V [96]. The specific emphasis of that project was to characterize gasses generated 
from decomposition of cable insulation in the presence of high currents and electric arcs. 
Measurements were taken of arcing induced on a 600V-rated cable. A recorded 
waveform from the project's final report is presented in Figure 3.  
Interestingly, waveforms observed in Figure 3 closely resemble arcing 
waveshapes previously observed on medium voltage systems, though in this laboratory 
setting they appear much more stable than naturally observed events, with significantly 
less cycle-to-cycle variability. The lack of variability may have been due to the relatively 
stable mechanical configuration of the experimental setup, which does not necessarily 
represent the dynamic mechanical conditions occurring during actual faults. This project 
also marked the first time stable arcing was achieved in a laboratory setting at 120/208V. 
Previous attempts to initiate and sustain arcs at or below 200V had little success. 
Together, these results were a significant advancement, representing one of the first 
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major contributions to foundational knowledge about arcing behavior below 480V in 70 
years.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Recorded arcing current waveform from gas evolution testing 
 
 
Experimentally, testing for gas evolution occurred in two phases. In the first 
phase, researchers attempted to measure decomposition effects due to ohmic (I2R) 
heating, and in the second phase they attempted to measure effects due to electric arcing. 
The arcing research was conducted by physically damaging cable insulation and 
conditioning the cable in order to produce a carbonized path. In some tests, a salt water 
solution was dripped into the conduit to simulate what is believed to happen as salt 
solution seeps into underground structures when roads are salted during snow and ice 
events. 
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Research indicated that thermal decomposition of cable insulation occurred when 
the cable's temperature exceeded 200 C. The composition of the gasses varied based on 
temperature, but it was observed that the primary combustible gasses were methane, 
ethylene, and carbon monoxide, though acetylene could be generated as the cable 
approached 400 C. Decomposition caused by electrical arcing produced similar results, 
with methane, ethylene, acetylene and carbon monoxide all observed. Certain cables also 
produced hydrogen chloride, sulfur dioxide, and hydrogen gas. Research indicated that 
gas generation rates were higher when the concentration of oxygen was reduced.  
A notable finding from this research was the suggestion that conditions could 
exist which would allow sporadic arcing to continue on a system in a high-impedance 
state for an indefinite period. This was very important finding, which raised several key 
questions. Does sporadic arcing occur weeks or months before a final event, only to die 
out until additional water, mud, sludge, etc. creates a semi-conductive path? Does the 
level of activity grow over time, finally reaching levels that produce enough gasses to 
cause explosions? At the time, these and other questions did not have concrete answers, 
but this conclusion from the gas evolution study, and prior fault anticipation work at 
Texas A&M both suggested there might be a substantial period of intermittent arcing 
episodes prior to final failures [16]. If the answer to the questions was determined to be 
"yes," it could provide the means to detect and locate arcing faults well in advance of 
manhole events, thereby enabling crews to prevent the final catastrophic failure 
altogether. Furthermore, the EPRI report itself suggested it might be possible to detect 
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the electrical signals produced by the arcing faults generated in the lab as a means of 
mitigating the arcing fault problem.  
While the answers to the questions raised in this report were unknown and 
technology did not exist to adequately investigate them at the time, in many ways these 
questions form the first formulation of the hypotheses explored in this research. 
2.1.2  3rd Avenue Yard Staged Arc Fault Tests 
2.1.2.1 Summary of Results 
One recommendation of EPRI's Gas Evaluation study was to investigate the 
potential for detecting arcing by monitoring electrical signals. In 1997 ConEdison began 
an internal project researching this possibility with staged experiments at their 3rd 
Avenue Yard facility in Brooklyn. Partial results of this research were published in [80]. 
For the 3rd Avenue Yard tests, cable faults were created in a section of cable added 
above ground, in conduit, between two manholes on one of ConEdison's networks. 
Electrical behavior was recorded in two locations with a high-speed data acquisition 
system (20,000 samples per second) monitoring directly at the end of the faulted cable 
section and in one vault location. Electrical behavior also was recorded with modified 
ETI relays in five locations. 
Figure 4 was taken from a report on the 3rd Avenue Yard tests and shows 
waveforms captured during one of the 3rd Avenue Yard trials. Spectral analysis of the 
data showed significant activity below 1,000Hz. Specifically, the activity was described 
as "pink" noise, increasing the general noise floor below 1,000Hz. The shape of the 
waveforms generated in the 3rd Avenue Yard tests look very similar to waveforms 
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captured during the gas evolution study.  In the case shown in Figure 4, we can note that 
the fault occurred on Phase B, with current exceeding 3,300 amps in the positive half-
cycle.  Both Phase A and C have much lower magnitudes, suggesting that they are 
inductively or capacitively induced sympathetic effects caused by the fault on Phase B. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show arcing current waveforms obtained from multiple 
locations during another staged event during the 3rd Avenue Yard tests. Figure 5 
contains fault measurements recorded directly at the point serving the fault, and thus 
represents the actual fault current served to the fault. Figure 6 shows waveforms 
recorded from a remote point in the network during the same fault. This is believed to be 
the first time a staged fault was recorded at multiple points in the network, suggesting 
the possibility of remote detection of arcing currents produced by naturally occurring 
faults. 
The report on the 3rd Avenue Yard Tests described data collected from the ETI 
relays as inconclusive, but it was noted that some disturbances were detected by the 
relays. Due to the nature of the Power Spectral Density below 1,000Hz, it was believed 
that such arcing faults would be detectable by relays, and a prototype program was 
recommended. 
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Figure 4: Current waveforms recorded during 3rd Avenue Yard tests 
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Figure 5: Arcing waveforms from 3rd Avenue Yard tests, Location “A” 
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Figure 6: Arcing waveforms from 3rd Avenue Yard tests, Location “E” 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Fashion Network Data Collection Project 
2.1.3.1 Summary of Results 
Following the recommendation of the 3rd Avenue Yard test final report, 
ConEdison began an internal project to explore the possibility of using a broad 
deployment of relays to detect the electrical signatures produced by arcing faults. In 
2005 ConEdison installed 50 Siemens model 7SJ64 relays in selected transformer vaults 
on the Fashion network. The Fashion network is a relatively small secondary network, 
and 50 monitored points represented a substantial percentage of the network’s 114 
network transformers. Figure 7 shows an enclosure containing one of the 7SJ64 relays, 
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as installed by ConEdison. For approximately two years, ConEdison used the 
oscillographic data capture capability of these relays to record waveforms from the 
network. These devices were capable of storing a maximum of nine records in a circular 
buffer with each waveform capture having a length of slightly over 1 second, at a sample 
rate of 960Hz. The three-phase currents were measured directly and the relays calculated 
a neutral current as the point-by-point sum of the three-phases. Event records were 
stored in the COMTRADE format, which is an industry standard file format for relay 
data. The records were managed by a proprietary Siemens software package. 
In order to retrieve the data, an engineer with a laptop physically travelled to 
each of the locations when an indication had been received that the buffer in a device 
was full and downloaded the data. This process was prone to some delay, however, and 
the circular buffer used in the device introduced the possibility that valuable data could 
be overwritten. At the end of the project, ConEdison had retrieved approximately 550 
data records, though due to various data management issues, only 64 were determined to 
be unique. These records were subsequently analyzed by Texas A&M for indications of 
arcing. 
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Figure 7: Installed enclosure containing Siemens 7SJ64 relay 
 
 
 
 2.1.3.2 Case Studies 
 Figure 8 contains normal, unaltered waveforms for an event that is designated as 
Sample Event A for purposes of this dissertation. Because this measurement is taken 
from a network transformer serving load, the measurements contain a pseudo steady-
state load component plus the transient current produced by the event of interest. To 
distinguish event current from the total current, a simple numerical technique was 
applied to remove the ambient load component. The resulting waveforms approximate 
the current of the event of interest alone and are shown in Figure 9 for Sample Event A. 
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Sample Event A is one of a handful of records retrieved in the project which 
researchers determined contained arcing signatures. The Fashion network project was 
significant as it produced the first known record of any naturally occurring arcing 
activity. Unfortunately, due to a variety of limitations, as discussed in Section 2.1.3.3, 
little could be said about this data in terms of fundamentally characterizing the arcing 
signatures themselves. Waveforms captured in the project resembled both waveforms 
collected in the 3rd Avenue Yard tests, the EPRI gas evolution study, and arcing faults 
observed on medium voltage systems, but serious questions remained about the actual 
behavior of arcing faults on the network. In particular, how arcing faults developed over 
time was still virtually unknown. 
The Siemens relays only captured about one second of data per event. As a 
result, it remained unknown whether there might be significant numbers of bursts over a 
substantial period of time leading up to a report of a manhole event, although past 
experience with other incipient failures suggested this was likely the case. 
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Figure 8: Unaltered waveforms measured during Event A 
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Figure 9: Waveforms from Event A, ambient load removed 
 
 
ConEdison contracted with researchers at Texas A&M to analyze data retrieved 
from the Fashion network project. Researchers qualitatively compared the shape and 
temporal behavior of these waveforms to their knowledge base of the behavior of arcing 
faults on overhead medium-voltage systems. These analyses revealed a number of 
similarities. 
In a general sense, the shape and temporal behavior of low-voltage arcing fault 
current mimicked characteristics of arcing faults on medium-voltage systems. More 
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specifically, there were apparent similarities in the shapes of the arcing waveforms. 
Also, waveforms appeared rich in harmonic and non-harmonic components, and 
exhibited significant cycle-to-cycle variations within a burst. Recorded cases also 
suggested that individual bursts of arcing current lasted cycles, with quiescent periods 
lasting cycles, seconds, or longer. These characteristics were again consistent with 
behavior observed in many instances of arcing faults on medium-voltage systems.   
While initial analysis suggested similarities between arcing on low-voltage 
networks and arcing on higher voltage systems, it also suggested significant differences. 
Most notably, arcing faults on medium-voltage systems almost always involve a single-
phase and ground. Multi-phase faults on medium-voltage systems tend to be 
conventional, low-impedance faults that can be cleared by conventional protection. Data 
from the Fashion network suggested this might not be the case for low-voltage arcing 
faults, as all of the events measured contained phase-to-phase activity. In their summary 
report, researchers noted this surprising finding, including the mention of a roundtable 
discussion held with ConEdison engineers where all parties speculated about the 
mechanical configurations that could bring about such electrical characteristics. The 
report clearly stated, however, that none of the theories advanced rose above the level of 
conjecture, since none were supported by actual data. 
In summary, researchers felt the data obtained in the Fashion network study 
offered encouraging similarities to data observed in previous tests and on medium 
voltage systems, but simultaneously highlighted all the outstanding questions about the 
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unknown fundamental characteristics of naturally occurring arcing faults on low-voltage 
networks. 
2.1.3.3 Limitations of Data Collected 
The Siemens relays used in the Fashion Network project were designed primarily 
to provide system protection, with data capture capabilities included as a secondary 
feature. While the collected data provided encouraging results, the analysis was limited 
significantly by the capabilities of the data collection device.  
For instance, the relays sampled data at 960Hz, or a nominal 16 points per cycle. This 
data rate is more than sufficient for relaying, but is inadequate for describing the high 
range of frequency components typically found in arcing events. While the lower sample 
rate was enough to say quantitatively “something” happened, and that the resulting 
waveforms might be arcing, it was not enough to define the actual characteristics of the 
fault sufficiently. 
More importantly, waveform recordings from the device were time limited to 
65,535 samples, which resulted in in records of slightly over one second in length. 
Furthermore, the device was only capable of holding nine such records at any given time 
in a circular buffer. 
Another significant limitation involved the labeling of the data captures from the 
Siemens relays. There were numerous demonstrable instances of data records that were 
labeled with the incorrect location (i.e., box number) or date and time. For example, 
there might be ten absolutely byte-by-byte identical waveforms that were labeled as 
having occurred at multiple locations over a span of months. Unfortunately there was no 
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key that would allow this mislabeling to be corrected. Out of approximately 550 data 
records retrieved by ConEdison, only 64 records were determined to be unique. Because 
of the widespread labeling errors, researchers had no confidence in any of the time or 
location information, and therefore could not match any of the records with any date, 
time or incident in utility operations records. In summary data from the Siemens relays 
provided multiple records where waveform data appeared quite valid, but with unreliable 
time and location information. 
Finally, the Siemens data collection devices were programmed to initiate data 
captures based on sensing multiple, rapid changes in neutral current over a short period 
of time. Normal system events (e.g., line switching, large load starting, etc.) can cause 
sudden changes in current as well. Because the data collection devices held only a very 
limited number of event records, setting the threshold for data capture sensitively could 
result in normal system events filling the available buffers and leaving little or no room 
for those events truly of interest. 
This problem was complicated by the reality of ConEdison personnel needing to 
visit each location on a regular basis to retrieve records. If the interval between visits 
allowed more than nine records to be captured, data would be lost. These factors 
combined to result in a tradeoff between sensitivity, data retention, and reasonable 
intervals between visits. Consequently, the devices were set to trigger only on relatively 
high levels of current. The result is that arcing events that might have occurred without 
reaching the threshold were ignored. 
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2.1.4  Summary 
These experiments and field measurements collectively captured the existence of 
arcing at 120/208V. However, many questions remained unanswered and a true model of 
fault behavior did not exist. 
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3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES, METHODS, AND GOALS 
 
While extensive research has been performed to characterize and detect naturally 
occurring arcing faults on medium voltage systems [1-75], very little information exists 
on naturally occurring arcing faults on low-voltage systems, particularly those operated 
at 120/208V. While studies have been performed measuring staged arcing faults in 
laboratory conditions, there is very limited information about how these faults behave on 
operational power systems. In particular, almost nothing is known about how such faults 
develop and recur over time, how long they may persist without being reported or 
cleared by conventional means, how far from their point of origin they can be 
electrically observed, and whether they can be located.  
One objective of this research was to collect an extensive database of naturally 
occurring arcing fault signatures on low-voltage, 120/208V networks, and subsequently 
analyze them to create a comprehensive record of how such faults behave on an 
operational secondary network. 
3.1  Hypotheses 
In particular, this research was designed to demonstrate conclusively the 
following hypotheses to be true: 
1) Arcing faults can persist for minutes, hours, days, or weeks before producing 
enough physical or electrical evidence to be detected by a utility company or 
the public. 
32 
 
 
2) Arcing faults at 120V can persist near-continuously for hours without self-
extinguishing or operating any protective device. 
3) Arcing faults on low-voltage secondary networks can be detected by 
monitoring primary feeders serving network transformers geographically 
proximate to the faulted location. 
4) Arcing faults can be readily detected by electrically monitoring secondary 
cables; both low and high current faults can be detected. 
5) Arcing fault current is served predominantly by network transformers closest 
to the fault location.  
6) Monitors not electrically near the fault location do not observe the fault.  
7) Faults can be located using multiple, simultaneous measurements of fault 
current on secondary cables.  
3.2 Goals	
The ultimate goal of this research is to provide a foundational, scientific basis for 
the detection, location, and mitigation of network arcing faults. If the above hypotheses 
are true, future systems can be developed which may allow network operators to 
substantially reduce the occurrence of catastrophic failures and public safety hazards on 
their systems, thereby improving reliability and reducing the potential for harm to the 
public. 
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4. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Overview and Timeline 
 Based on findings from previous research projects at Texas A&M and 
ConEdison, both parties undertook a fundamental study to explore the behavior of arcing 
faults on 120/208V secondary networks. To this end, an experiment was devised where 
30 underground points would be monitored for a nominal period of one year, to be 
extended based on observed results. ConEdison selected the Cooper Square network in 
Manhattan as the installation site for the project. The project also included instrumenting 
one of the 26 primary feeders serving the networks. 
 4.1.1 Project Questions for Investigation 
At the beginning of the project, there were several unanswered questions about 
the behavior of arcing faults on secondary networks: 
1) Would incipient arcing faults produce enough current to be observed by 
underground monitoring points? 
2) Would the current distribution of such faults be so broad across the network 
that virtually every underground monitor would record every network 
arcing fault? 
3) How long might an arcing fault remain in an incipient condition before 
resulting in a final, catastrophic failure?  
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 Do most secondary network arcing faults clear themselves permanently 
“in less than a tenth of a second,” as proposed by conventional 
wisdom[89]? 
 How many faults would be cleared by conventional system protection? 
 Do some faults occur at detectable levels with enough advanced warning 
to enable crews to fix the condition and prevent a manhole event, 
assuming the fault location can be found? 
4) Would secondary network arcing faults be visible on primary feeders 
serving the network?  
5) If they could be observed, would the characteristics of arcing faults on low-
voltage systems resemble those of arcing on medium-voltage systems?   
6) Would it be possible to locate faults based on electrical measurements? 
4.1.2 Project Timeline 
To assess the survivability of the proposed data collection devices (DCDs) underground, 
ConEdison ordered four initial units to be installed prior to the remaining twenty-six. 
These four units were delivered to ConEdison and became operational in March 2009. 
Communication was lost to one of the units within a few weeks. Site visits revealed the 
cell modem at the site had suffered a catastrophic failure, possibly due to water incursion 
in its enclosure. A replacement modem was ordered, and installed in July. Within weeks 
of the replacement modem installation, communication was again lost with the unit. 
Ultimately, it was determined that the underground structure had been flooded, resulting 
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in the malfunction of both the second cell modem and the DCD. The other three original 
DCDs functioned without incident. 
ConEdison ordered the remaining twenty-six DCDs following the successful 
installation of the original four units. The units were delivered in two shipments to 
ConEdison over the summer months. By the end of April 2010, most of the twenty-six 
units were installed and operational. Intermittent communication failures have generally 
meant that nominally twenty-five DCDs are operational and communicating at any given 
time. Monitoring of these units continues as of the writing of this dissertation. 
Winter is traditionally the active season for manhole events in New York, and 
winter weather activity was expected to result in significant arcing. The winter of 
2010-2011 turned out to be exceptionally harsh in New York City, with near 
record levels of snowfall. On several occasions, the severe weather produced an 
extremely high volume of arcing-related waveform captures on DCDs. 
 
4.2 Cooper Square Network 
4.2.1 Network Overview 
The Cooper Square Network serves approximately 65,000 electric customers in 
Manhattan and is bounded by Broadway on the west, the East river on the east, 14th and 
15th Streets on the north, and Canal and Market streets on the south, as shown in  
Figure 10. The estimated network peak load was 247MW in 2007, and weekend loads 
were expected to peak at 197MW.   
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Figure 10: Map of Cooper Square Network  
(source: ConEdison Distribution Engineering Manual, 2007) 
 
 
The network is supplied by 26, 13.8kV primary feeders served from the Ave. A 
Area Substation. Ave. A is the only area substation serving the Cooper Square network, 
and Cooper Square is the only network served by Ave. A.  Each primary feeder serves 
multiple network transformers, predominantly 1,000kVA, with some 500kVA and 
2,000kVA transformers at selected installations. A table of the primary feeders and load 
projections, along with number of network transformers is supplied in Figure 11. Cooper 
Square contains a total of 428 network transformers with a total connected capacity of 
373MVA.  
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Figure 11: Table of feeders with normal load and network transformers supplied 
(Source: Con Edison, 2007 Distribution Engineering Manual) 
 
 
 4.2.2 Selection of Monitoring Sites 
Thirty underground sites were selected for monitoring. These sites were selected 
by analyzing historical data to determine the geographical distribution of manhole events 
on the Cooper Square network. The network is mapped into various “M&S Plates,” 
which form a grid across the network. Each plate is identified by a number and letter 
combination, for example 14J. The plates containing the Cooper Square network are 
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numbered 17 to 10, from north to south, and I to O from west to east. For example, the 
geographic center of the network would be located somewhere in plate 14L. 
ConEdison keeps records of all manhole events, including the street address at which 
they occurred. Seven years of data was analyzed, and each plate was assigned a number 
equal to the total number of manhole events which had occurred during the time period 
of available data. These values were then normalized and used to distribute the thirty 
underground monitoring sites based on plate location. The results of this process are 
shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
. 
 
Table 1: Number of manhole events by plate, Cooper Square Network, 2000-2007 
J K L M N O 
17 5 10 15 7 6 - 
16 12 6 3 9 10 - 
15 8 11 3 1 5 0 
14 20 10 14 7 7 0 
13 8 10 8 3 4 0 
12 6 7 12 7 1 2 
11 7 21 6 3 4 1 
10 30 15 14 11 2 1 
9 13 0 17 6 2 0 
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This method of distribution did not yield whole numbers, as can be seen in Table 
2. Additionally, it was understood that some locations might not be suitable for 
installation of devices because, for example, if they were prone to flooding. As a result, a 
total of forty locations were submitted to ConEdison for evaluation as installation sites 
for DCDs, as shown in Table 2. The final sites selected for device installation are shown 
on a map of Manhattan in Figure 12. A table of all vault numbers and street addresses is 
given in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2: Proposed distribution of data collection devices 
J K L M N O 
17 0 1 1.5 1 0 
16 1 0 0 1 1 
15 1 1 0 0 0 0 
14 2 1 1.5 1 1 0 
13 1 1 1 0 0 0 
12 0 1 1 1 0 0 
11 1 2 0 0 0 0 
10 2.5 1.5 1.5 1 0 0 
9 1 0 1.5 0.5 0 0 
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Figure 12: Data collection device installation sites 
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Table 3: Data collection device installation sites 
Vault 
Number 
Primary 
Feeder Plate Address 
5445 07M25 10J BAXTER ST E22N HESTER ST 
3544 07M35 10K BOWERY 74         NLY 
7755 07M23 10K HESTER ST S72W CHRYSTIE ST 
6839 07M31 10L ALLEN ST E33N HESTER ST 
7385 07M32 10L HESTER ST N136E LUDLOW ST 
1109 07M22 10M E BROADWAY 189 
6561 07M53 11J BAXTER ST E51S GRAND ST 
3283 07M20 11K BROOME ST 324 
7369 07M21 11K BOWERY ST E30N GRAND ST 
2855 07M23 12K RIVINGTON ST 45 
0199 07M38 12L SUFFOLK ST 87 
5083 07M57 12M DELANCEY ST N26E PITT ST 
7475 07M51 13I CROSBY ST 116 
7926 07M35 13J E 1 ST BOWERY 
8185 07M31 13K ALLEN ST C34S  STANTON ST 
3888 07M37 13L SUFFOLK ST W28N STANTON ST 
8292 07M53 14J E 3 ST S90E BOWERY 
9698 07M24 14J BOND ST S33W LAFAYETTE ST 
8442 07M23 14K E 2 ST N25E 1 AV 
9742 07M32 14K 2 ST S32W 2 AVE 
9116 07M33 15J COOPER SQ PARK_48N E 6 ST 
9326 07M24 15J LAFAYETTE ST 427 
4238 07M24 15K E 5 ST S32E 1 AV 
4413 07M36 16J 4 AV 42           2ND NLY 
8106 07M39 16J E 9 ST 71         ELY 
9216 07M52 16J ST MARKS PL 19 
6361 07M54 17L E 12 ST S47W  AV A 
5847 07M28 17M E 13 ST  N  E AV B 
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4.3 Measurement Equipment 
 4.3.1 Overview 
The measurement devices selected for this data collection project were based on 
devices developed for the Distribution Fault Anticipation project at Texas A&M 
University under grants from EPRI and the U.S. Department of Energy. This platform 
was developed over a period of 15 years to provide high-speed, high-fidelity 
measurements of power system events with the aim of anticipating incipient fault 
conditions and providing actionable information to utilities. In addition to high quality 
measurement data, the chosen platform includes advanced data management and 
viewing software allowing for automated retrieval and convenient analysis of large 
numbers of captured waveforms.  
 4.3.2 Data Collection System 
 4.3.2.1 Field Units 
The DCDs used in this project were designed and developed for the Distribution 
Fault Anticipation (DFA) project at Texas A&M University. The standard DFA 
hardware was designed to be contained in a 19” rack-mount chassis for installation in a 
substation. Because DCDs used in this project were to be mounted underground in a 
NEMA enclosure, heat dissipation was a significant concern. As a result, a second 
mechanical packaging using the same electronics was designed and designated the “open 
frame” chassis. This mechanical configuration allowed heat to escape more easily from 
the electronics, reducing temperatures near the boards themselves. The two alternative 
configurations of DFA hardware are shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14. Figure 13 shows 
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the standard 19-inch rack-mount DFA unit. One of these units was installed at the Ave. 
A area substation on a single primary feeder. Figure 14 shows the open-frame chassis, 
which was subsequently mounted in a NEMA enclosure for installation underground 
described further in Section 4.3.2.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: 19-inch rack-mount DFA unit 
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Figure 14: Open frame chassis used as DCD 
 
 
The electronics onboard the DCD consist of an off the shelf single board 
computer (SBC) and two custom designed interface boards. The SBC connects to the 
“analog board,” which holds a programmable logic controller (PLC) and custom signal 
processing circuitry. The analog board is responsible for all data conditioning and 
sampling, as well as low level functions like a watchdog timer. The analog board pairs 
with a “magnetics board” containing current transformers (CTs) and potential 
transformers (PTs) which accept inputs at the terminals of the device and convert them 
to signal levels. These signals are then passed to the analog board for processing. 
The magnetics board accepts inputs from standard 120V/5A power system PTs and CTs, 
which are the de facto standard used for inputs to power system relays. The voltage 
inputs are directly connected to PTs on the magnetics board, which transform them to 
the appropriate range for sampling.  
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There are three sets of CTs on the magnetics board, each of which has a single-
phase current passing through it. Two sets of CTs are used to sample the individual 
phase currents at different resolutions. One set measures a nominal 0-7A (“normal”) 
range, and the other a nominal 0-100A (“fault”) range, with both channels sampling at 
16-bits using the same sample clock. Because power system faults can produce very 
large currents (on the order of 50A+ at the input terminals of the device), it is necessary 
to have the range of the fault channel to accurately measure these events. However, 
during normal system operation, the DCD will see only a nominal 5A at its input 
terminals, meaning that 95% of the fault channel’s converter range is unused. To more 
accurately characterize small incipient signals and provide the highest fidelity data 
possible, the normal range currents are used whenever they are not saturated. If the 
normal channel converters are saturated, the fault channel data is available. The third set 
of CTs produce a sampled neutral current for the normal channels. The outputs of each 
of these CTs are summed electrically and the result sampled at the same range as the 
normal current channels. The neutral of the fault channels, by contrast, is produced by a 
mathematical sum of the fault channel phase currents. 
All current and voltage waveforms are sampled at 15,360Hz, or a nominal 256 
points per cycle. Because the power system frequency constantly varies from its nominal 
60Hz value, the converters employ a Phase Lock Loop (PLL) to track power system 
frequency as closely as possible. The DCDs are capable of recording 15 channels at this 
rate, as listed in Table 4. 
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Normal and fault channels have previously been described in discussion of CTs 
on the magnetics board. High frequency current channels are produced from the normal 
data channel after being processed by a 120dB digital high-pass filter with bandpass 
frequency of 2,000Hz.  
In addition to high-speed waveforms, the DCDs also produce a number of 
calculated values which are stored on a per-cycle or 2-cycle basis.  These values include:  
 the RMS of each of the sampled signals 
 the RMS of a cycle-by-cycle subtraction of normal current, fault current, 
high-frequency current, and voltage waveforms  
 individual components of a 2-cycle FFT of normal current, up to 960Hz  
 cycle-by-cycle values of real power (P), reactive power (Q), complex power 
(S), and power factor, calculated both from the high-speed waveforms 
(RMS power) and the 60Hz component of high-speed waveforms (Phasor 
power)  
 phase angles for both voltage and current waveforms.  
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Table 4: Desciptions of high-speed waveform channels 
Signal Description 
VA Voltage, Channel A 
VB Voltage, Channel B 
VC Voltage, Channel C 
INormA Normal Current, Channel A 
INormB Normal Current, Channel B 
INormC Normal Current, Channel C 
INormN Normal Current, Channel N 
IFaultA Fault Current, Channel A 
IFaultB Fault Current, Channel B 
IFaultC Fault Current, Channel C 
IFaultN Fault Current, Channel N 
IHFA High Frequency Current, Channel A 
IHFB High Frequency Current, Channel B 
IHFC High Frequency Current, Channel C 
IHFN High Frequency Current, Channel N 
 
 
Each of these quantities are available on demand in recorded waveform files. It is 
also often important to have an idea of how system behavior changes over longer periods 
of time. To this end, the DCDs also record the minimum, maximum, average, and 
standard deviation of every quantity they measure over a configurable period of time, 
nominally set at 15 minutes. This data is invaluable when attempting to set thresholds for 
triggering waveform captures, discussed further in Section 4.4.2.1. These statistical 
values are referred to as “interval data.” 
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 4.3.2.2 Underground Enclosures 
To survive exposed conditions in underground vaults, the DCD electronics were 
installed in a NEMA 4 enclosure measuring 20”x16”x10.” Inside the enclosure, a power 
supply converted the 120V AC line voltage obtained directly from ConEdison’s 
secondary network to 14VDC, supplying power both to the DCD and a battery installed 
for backup power. All three voltage inputs were fused with 2A fuses, and CT terminals 
were attached directly to the DCD. Also included was a temperature cutoff switch, 
designed to turn the DCD off if temperature in the enclosure exceeded 168F to prevent 
damage to the device itself. A picture displaying the final configuration is located in 
Figure 15. 
4.3.2.3 Master Station 
Each DCD independently communicates with a “master station” located at Texas 
A&M. This communication is performed over a standard TCP/IP connection via cell 
modem. The communication system itself is described in more detail in Section 4.3.3.  
The master station is responsible for data retrieval and storage, as well as updating 
settings for the device in the field. During the communication interval, the master station 
retrieves all available waveform files, all interval data, and then updates whatever 
system settings have changed (e.g. triggering thresholds, CT/PT settings, etc), and 
finally performs software updates to the field device, if any are available. 
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Figure 15: NEMA enclosure with DCD installed 
 
 
The master station serves as a common collection point, maintaining a full 
database of all events recorded and retrieved, as well as all interval data collected on all 
units. Data contained at the master station can be opened by a custom software package 
(DFAGui) which allows for advanced analysis of large numbers of waveforms, as well 
as viewing interval data.  
One important feature of the DFAGui software is its load removal, or “phasor-
differencing” function. This function will be explained in more detail in Section 5. 
Another important function of the DFAGui software is its ability to sort and organize 
waveform files. The DFAGui allows a user to assign a classification to each waveform 
record, which can then be used to filter waveform files of interest. For example, a user 
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can easily select all files which have been given a classification related to arcing over a 
specified time period, if so desired. 
4.3.3 Communication System 
ConEdison contracted with AT&T to provide communication to underground 
monitors for the Arc Fault Data Collection Project. Each device communicated via a cell 
modem installed external to the DCD in a separate NEMA enclosure. The cell modems 
each obtained a static IP address from AT&T’s network, and allowed the DCD to 
communicate over the internet to the master station at Texas A&M.  
While communication was intended to be “always on,” it was not uncommon for 
devices to lose communication, sometimes for days or weeks at a time. DCDs continued 
to operate and record data in the event of a communication loss, and were equipped with 
sufficient storage that, except in rare cases, no data was lost. 
While no speed tests were explicitly performed to determine the data rate at 
which the communication system was able to transfer, in general performance was 
considered “good enough” given the research nature of the project. In most instances, 
waveform files were retrieved within 15 minutes of their occurrence, though in cases of 
extreme backlog and slow communications, some units took months to fully retrieve all 
recorded waveforms. 
4.3.4 Instrumentation Transformers 
Direct measurement of high currents and voltages are not generally possible with 
high precision measurement devices. To convert system-level currents and voltages to 
signal-level magnitudes, current transformers and potential transformers are used. 
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Typical installations of DFA devices have used meter-quality substation CTs and PTs to 
provide 120V/5A inputs at the device terminal. Because DCDs for this project were 
installed underground, different sensors were required. 
Since the nominal voltage of the network is already 120/208V, no PTs were 
required to provide device level inputs. Each phase was connected to the voltage input 
terminals of the DCD through a 2 amp fuse. Phase A had an additional connection 
through a temperature switch, and was also connected to an AC/DC power supply input. 
There was an initial question of whether the switching power supply would adversely 
affect signal quality on Phase A voltage. A test installation at the Annex substation in 
Bryan, Texas, used as a burn-in site by Texas A&M, showed significant dips in Phase A 
voltage, particularly when the backup battery was charging. This test installation was 
powered by the relay PT output, which was determined to be a significant contributing 
factor to the voltage distortions. Reconnecting the Phase A input to a 120V wall outlet at 
the Annex substation alleviated the problem. Installed devices on ConEdison’s 
120/208V network experienced no issues with distortion due to the switching power 
supply. 
The CTs selected for the project were required to have high ratios due to the 
large available fault currents on the network. Estimates for fault current in many 
structures exceeded 50,000A. Additionally, multiple cables are generally run per phase, 
and the selected CTs would be required to measure current on all cables. ConEdison’s 
previous data collection projects on the secondary network had used a CT produced by 
Flex Core, a division of Morlan & Associates Inc. These CTs were offered in a variety 
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of ratios and sizes. While the specification sheets only claimed to pass frequencies 
between 50-400Hz, results from data collected on Siemens relays during the Fashion 
network project suggested that performance should be sufficient to characterize arcing 
faults adequately. The particular models selected for use in this project were 3000:5 CTs 
with an 11” inner diameter. At the selected CT ratio, the DCD’s “normal” current 
channel saturates at 4200 amperes (RMS), and the “fault” channel saturates at 60,000 
amperes (RMS).  
 
4.4 Recorded Data 
 4.4.1 Interval Data 
The values of the minimum, maximum, average, and standard deviation for each 
of the measured and calculated parameters obtained by the DCD are recorded in a 
database at a configurable interval of time, typically set to 15 minutes. This includes 
both high-speed waveform data and calculated parameters such as harmonic spectra. 
Figure 16 shows values for the average RMS current over each 15 minute interval 
recorded during calendar year 2010. This data is useful for determining when load shifts 
occurred on the network, as there are generally step changes in the average current at 
affected locations. One such shift can be observed on the right fifth of Figure 16.  
Other interval plots that are of particular use for longer periods of time are the 
maximum current and minimum voltage recorded at 15 minute intervals, shown in 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively. The minimum voltage plot can be useful for 
locating events which substantially affect the power system voltage, such as large arcing 
53 
 
 
events, or overcurrent faults on a primary feeder, or the transmission system, while the 
maximum current plot can be used to see high current events located on the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Average RMS current (15 minute interval) for one year period, V4413 
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Figure 17: Maximum RMS current (15 minute interval) for one year period, V4413 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Minimum RMS voltage (15 minute interval) for one year period, V4413 
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 4.4.2 Waveform Files 
 4.4.2.1 Triggering 
The main sources of recorded data in this project are waveform files. Each DCD 
continually monitors both current and voltage waveforms looking for power system 
transients. Most transients which occur on a power system are “normal” system events, 
and not of any special interest. These may include motors starting, capacitors switching, 
overcurrent faults, and inrush transients. Previous research has shown that incipient 
arcing faults often produce transients with currents less than or equal to the transients 
produced by many of these “normal” system events [14]. Because incipient arcing 
transients are extremely important to this project, devices were set to trigger sensitively, 
recording relatively small transients. As a result, devices also captured large numbers of 
normal power system transients, including all of the events mentioned above.  
Each underground device served loads primarily in its own geographic area, and 
as a result each device observed certain local transient conditions not common to other 
devices. For instance, a motor located in a building proximate to a certain vault would be 
served primarily by that vault, and might not be seen by a location even a block away. 
These locally specific transient events required each device’s triggering thresholds to be 
specifically tuned to capture the maximum number of events of interest, while avoiding 
large numbers of unnecessary normal events. 
Ideal triggering parameters are sensitive to arcing faults, but insensitive to 
normal system events. Ineffective triggering parameters have no such selectivity. To 
determine appropriate parameters for use as triggering thresholds, a basic understanding 
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of the types of signatures typically produced by arcing faults and normal system 
transients is essential. 
In the majority of previous work focusing on arcing faults, arcing was assumed 
to be phase-to-ground, as any phase-to-phase contact almost immediately resulted in a 
low-impedance bolted fault. Phase-to-ground events are generally easier to detect than 
phase-to-phase events, because they produce variations in the neutral current. Normal 
system transients, by contrast, tend to be three-phase events, and result in little to no 
change in neutral current. As an example, a three-phase motor might produce several 
hundred amperes of transient current on each phase, but might produce less than 10 
amperes of current on the neutral conductor. By contrast, a small phase-to-ground arcing 
fault would produce many times this amount of current on the neutral, simply due to its 
nature as a single-phase event. While any single-phase event would behave in a similar 
fashion, non-arcing-related single-phase events large enough to be observed at 
transformer vaults are rare on the secondary network.  
As the project progressed, it became clear that many secondary network arcing 
faults were not phase-to-ground, but rather exhibited phase-to-phase or complex three-
phase interactions. These faults might not be detected by focusing exclusively on the 
neutral channel. Another characteristic of arcing faults is their broad spectrum frequency 
content. Many normal system transients also produce harmonic content, but in the case 
of most normal transients, this content tends to be dominated by odd as opposed to even 
harmonics. Arcing faults, by contrast, produce large harmonic currents in both odd and 
57 
 
 
even harmonics. Consequently, both the 120Hz and 240Hz bands were targeted as being 
appropriate parameters for triggering. 
Three-phase arcing events were found to be sensitive to both of the parameters 
mentioned above. Additionally, large three-phase arcing events tended to produce 
currents sufficiently large enough to affect system voltage. The architecture of a 
secondary network results in an extremely stiff voltage, meaning that very large changes 
in current are required to significantly affect the voltage observed remotely from the 
fault point. In practice on the network, an event of several thousand amperes was 
required to change the local voltage magnitude by more than 2%. In some cases, major 
three-phase events were observed to produce voltage sags to 90% of nominal, though 
this was a rare occurrence. 
As discussed above, each location exhibited a unique signature of transients 
based on the loads in its geographical area. Each location therefore needed thresholds 
tuned to the particular loads in its area. Four parameters were primarily used for 
triggering thresholds: 120Hz magnitude, 240Hz magnitude, the RMS of a point-by-point 
cycle difference, and a percentage change in RMS voltage. The harmonic components 
are calculated from an FFT performed over a 2-cycle window, and represent the 
magnitude of energy at that harmonic value. The RMS of the difference of two cycles is 
calculated as a “simple” difference, where each cycle is subtracted from the preceding 
cycle on a point-by-point basis, and the RMS calculated from the resulting signal. 
Each of these parameters is reasonably decoupled from absolute system load conditions. 
In the case of harmonic currents, even harmonics are not generally sustained on a normal 
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power system for any length of time. As an example, a location with over 1,000 amperes 
of RMS load current would generally contain less than 5 amperes at the second 
harmonic (120Hz), as shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. These figures contain interval 
data from a selected unit for a one week period.  
Figure 19 shows the average RMS currents measured at V9326 over a one week 
period. These graphs are derived from the interval data stored by each DCD as discussed 
in Section 4.4.1. Each day begins with a relatively low load in the night, rising sharply in 
the morning, and peaking in the early afternoon before returning to nighttime levels. The 
two days with significantly lower peaks represent a weekend period, while the five days 
with highest peaks represent weekdays. Figure 20 shows the average 120Hz components 
of current measured at 15 minute intervals during this same time period. While the same 
diurnal cycle can be seen, the absolute current level is much lower, with an absolute 
peak of 3.5 amperes, compared to a total-load peak of over 1,300 amperes. Finally, 
Figure 21 shows the maximum value of 120Hz current recorded at each 15 minute 
interval over the same one week period of time. In this graph, clear peaks indicate 
transient activity. Another important feature of this graph can be observed in a transition 
of “steady state” maximum values during the day on May 12. This transition was caused 
by a load shift within the network, which is typical in the event of a primary feeder being 
removed from service, or restoration of a primary feeder which had previously been out 
of service. 
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Figure 19: Average RMS currents (15 minute interval) over one week period, V9326 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Average 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9326 
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Figure 21: Maximum 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9326 
 
 
 
The third parameter used for triggering is the RMS of a cycle-to-cycle “simple” 
difference, where each cycle is subtracted from the previous cycle on a point-by-point 
basis. This parameter is a measure of cycle-to-cycle variability typically produced by 
transient events. Figure 22 shows the average value of this parameter as measured during 
each 15 minute interval over the same one week period used in the examples of 
harmonic current. Figure 23 shows the maximum value of this parameter as measured 
over the same time intervals and time period. As shown in Figure 22, there is a more or 
less constant level of average transient activity loosely correlated to system load. When 
viewing the maximum transient observed in a given interval, as in Figure 23, clear 
“spikes” corresponding to major transient events are visible. In particular, the neutral 
current clearly shows activity indicative of single-phase transient events. 
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Figure 22: Average RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9326 
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Figure 23: Maximum RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9326 
 
 
The physical  locations of these DCDs are shown in Figure 24. As previously 
mentioned, each device has its own unique fingerprint associated with loads served in its 
local geographic area. By way of comparison, Figure 25-Figure 29 are provided from the 
closest DCD to V9326, which is V9116. Even though these devices are less than an 
electrical block from each other, the transient currents seen by each device differ 
significantly.  
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Figure 24: Locations of V9326 and V9116 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Average RMS currents (15 minute interval) over one week period, V9116 
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Figure 26: Average 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9116 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Maximum 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9116 
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Figure 28: Average RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9116 
 
 
Figure 29: Maximum RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V9116 
66 
 
 
One inherent drawback to the secondary network architecture is that certain 
monitored locations are significantly less sensitive than other locations, depending on 
loads in the immediate geographic area. Figure 30-Figure 34 contain the same series of 
graphs at a location with a very large local load, which has a startup transient shown in 
Figure 35. If Figure 30 is contrasted with Figure 19, the absolute load levels are 
approximately the same, with daytime peaks of roughly 1,300A. Figure 34 and Figure 23 
show a significantly different picture, however. While V9326 has a baseline maximum 
differenced current of approximately 100 amperes for each phase current, V8442 has a 
similar baseline of between 350 and 500 amperes, depending on the phase. This 
effectively means that in any given 15 minute interval, V8442 can expect to see at least 
one load with a startup transient of between 350 and 500 amperes. Thus, the RMS 
difference parameter cannot be set close to this value without resulting in an excessive 
number of captures. The end result is that events which would be easily detectible at 
V9326 are undetectable at V8442 because of the higher transient baseline.  
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Figure 30: Average RMS currents (15 minute interval) over one week period, V8442 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Average 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V8442 
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Figure 32: Maximum 120Hz component of current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V8442 
 
 
Figure 33: Average RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V8442 
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Figure 34: Maximum RMS "differenced" current (15 minute interval) over one week 
period, V8442 
 
 
Figure 35: RMS currents from a large motor start, V8442 
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4.4.2.2 Contents of recorded waveform files 
Information written into the permanent recorded waveform files is configurable. 
At first, DCDs in this experiment were configured to record all available channels. This 
included the fifteen high-speed channels in Table 4, as well as all harmonic and other 
calculated parameters.  
Previous projects using DFA hardware were served by communication systems 
which offered high data bandwidth and unmetered data limits, making waveform file 
size a secondary concern. The cell modems used in this project were both considerably 
slower than systems used in other projects, and were programmed to shut off for the 
remainder of the calendar month once a 5GB data limit was reached. Complicating this 
situation was the discovery that network arcing faults could generate tremendous 
amounts of data in short periods of time, something not previously observed in other 
projects. The largest data cards, used in 26 of the 30 DCDs, were capable of holding one 
hour and eighteen minutes of data with all channels stored. 
Decreasing the number of bytes in each file for a given period of recorded data 
would reduce the number of bytes transferred back to the master station, thereby 
effectively increasing transfer rates. Reduction in the data rate would also effectively 
increase the length of captured waveform data that could be stored locally on the DCD. 
To accomplish this, multiple channels were eliminated from stored waveform files, 
generally under the justification that they could later be recreated digitally if necessary.  
Since high-speed channels consumed the most data within a file, elimination of 
these channels, where possible, was given top priority. Because the maximum current 
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that could be reasonably measured by the “normal” range currents was approximately 
4,200A RMS, it was judged that the “fault” range channels were necessary to properly 
characterize large events. The neutral for the fault range, however, is calculated from the 
three individual phases, rather than being sampled separately. As a result, it could be 
eliminated and recreated from the three-phase channels. 
A similar evaluation was performed with the high-frequency channels. After 
capturing initial test data, it became clear that arcing was easily detectable without using 
the high frequency channels. Additionally, the channels themselves were derived from 
the application of a digital high-pass filter to the normal range currents, and could be 
recreated after the fact. However, it was judged that unless there were some way to 
easily determine whether useful information might exist in the high frequency channels, 
it was unlikely they would ever be recreated, even if the procedure were possible. To 
preserve some of the high frequency information, the neutral high-frequency channel 
was retained, while the phase high-frequency channels were eliminated. 
While calculated quantities did not consume as many bytes per channel as the 
high-speed waveform data, eliminating unnecessary channels was still beneficial. By 
default, each individual harmonic component up to 960Hz was stored in the capture file 
every two cycles. Because most of the harmonic energy is contained in the first few 
harmonics, analysis was performed on initial data to determine whether any additional 
value was gained by retaining higher order harmonics. It was determined that, in general, 
the magnitudes of harmonics above 330Hz did not offer enough value to keep them in 
the capture file, given that all harmonics could be recreated on demand if necessary. 
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Additionally, previous research on the DFA project has suggested that calculated RMS 
power values (P, Q, S, PF) are of questionable validity during transient conditions, 
particularly compared to values calculated from quantities derived from the 60Hz 
components of currents and voltages. As a result, all RMS power quantities were 
removed.  
The resultant waveform files were approximately 73% of the size of waveform 
files containing all signals. This increased the amount of waveform data which could be 
recorded on disk to approximately one hour and forty-seven minutes. 
4.4.3 Summary 
The triggering and data management procedures described have been very 
effective in creating a competent database of recorded network arcing faults for 
investigation. This database will be of significant value to future researchers. 
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5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
 
Over a period of two years, DCDs installed on ConEdison’s Cooper Square 
network monitored and recorded transient events. From the installation of the first units 
in March 2009 through the end of March 2011, DCDs recorded over 145,000 unique 
waveform transients, comprising over 205 hours of recorded waveform data. 
Approximately 43,500 of the waveform files contained distinct arcing signatures. 
Additionally, approximately 3,500 of the transients were tied to 42 separate manhole 
events reported to ConEdison by conventional means. 
Information obtained from captured waveform files was groundbreaking, and 
provided a unique opportunity to characterize and document the behavior of naturally 
occurring arcing faults. It would be difficult to summarize and discuss all the lessons 
learned from the study of data recorded during this project. Addressing my specific 
research goals for this dissertation and the most important findings, the following can be 
said: 
 Waveform data from this project contain what are believed to be the first 
high-fidelity, full duration recordings of naturally occurring arcing faults 
on a 120/208V secondary network simultaneously seen at multiple 
locations. Appendix A presents a case study of an event recorded 
simultaneously at two underground monitoring points which led to a 
manhole event. 
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 Recorded waveform transients demonstrate that arcing events can exist 
for long periods of time, many times on the order of hours, without self-
extinguishing. The project recorded multiple instances where arcing faults 
persisted on an almost continual basis for hours before crews located the 
fault and cut cables, or the fault eventually burned clear. The most 
dramatic instance of this behavior is detailed in Appendix B, where a 
network arcing fault continued intermittently for approximately 72 hours 
without causing a conventional report of a manhole event. During the 72 
hour period, over 2,000 unique waveform records with distinct arcing 
transients were observed and recorded, with many of the waveform 
records containing multiple arcing transients. 
 Project data are also believed to contain the first ever observations of 
naturally occurring arcing faults located on a secondary network that 
were simultaneously recorded on both the network itself, and on a 
primary feeder serving transformers proximate to the faulted location. 
Appendix C presents a case study involving measurements of the same 
network arcing fault simultaneously sampled at three underground 
monitors and a primary feeder serving other transformers in the 
geographic area of the faulted location. This particular event began over a 
seven hour period where arcing was persistently, but intermittently 
observed at two underground locations and the primary feeder. Following 
the initial seven hour period, no arcing was observed for the next fifteen-
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hours. Twenty-two hours after the initial arcing observation, the two 
original underground monitors, a third underground monitor, and the 
substation-based DCD recorded arcing on a near-continuous basis over 
the next four-hours. This electrical activity resulted in two manhole fires. 
 Recordings from multiple events have demonstrated that arcing faults can 
recur persistently for extended periods of time before progressing to final 
failure or generating enough physical evidence to be observed by the 
public. Appendix D presents a case study of an event which was observed 
over a period of eighteen days before being located and repaired by a 
utility crew.  
 Finally, several recordings exist where the same arcing fault was 
observed by multiple underground monitors, providing new insight into 
fault current distributions on secondary networks. In particular, Appendix 
E details a pioneering event where measurements from five underground 
monitoring points were used to accurately determine the location of an 
arcing fault which lay dormant for four months.  
These case studies represent only a small fraction of data observed, recorded, and 
analyzed over the course of this project. For each of the case studies presented here, 
additional examples exist which serve to confirm the general findings outlined above. 
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6. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Load Extraction Via Signal Processing 
Measurement of transient events on operational systems occurs in the presence of 
nominal load current. Often, the magnitude of the load current during the transient 
condition far exceeds the magnitude of the transient event itself. Even if the transient 
magnitude is large compared to the load, adequately characterizing the event is 
complicated by the presence of load current. As a result, a critical component of analysis 
related to transient conditions in general and arcing faults in particular is the 
development of a method to estimate pre-event load current so it can be removed from 
the measured signal, with the resulting signal being as good an estimate as possible of 
the event current alone.  
In general, transient currents and load currents have different phase angles and 
harmonic contents, and as a result a simple cycle-by-cycle subtraction is not a good 
estimate of fault current. In previous research conducted at Texas A&M’s Power System 
Automation Laboratory, advanced digital signal processing techniques have been 
developed to account for these variations and produce a low-noise estimate of event 
current during transient conditions. This process is internally known as “phasor 
differencing,” and was used extensively in this project.  
Figure 36-Figure 39 illustrate the importance of such load removal algorithms. 
Figure 36 shows a six-second period of high-speed waveforms recorded during the 
course of this research. From this view, it is not immediately obvious that any transient 
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condition has occurred. Figure 37 shows the same six seconds of data after processing 
through the phasor differencing routines. From the same zoom level, it is clear that a 
half-cycle arc burst with magnitude of approximately 300 amperes has occurred at 
approximately 3.5 seconds in this waveform capture. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Six-second waveform capture containing single half-cycle arc burst, 
unprocessed current waveforms 
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Figure 37: Six-second waveform capture containing single half-cycle arc burst, phasor 
differenced currents 
 
 
Figure 38 shows a portion of the same data zoomed to show the faulted section of 
the waveform recording in greater detail. The fault is visible upon close inspection as a 
slightly distorted peak on Phase C between 3.560 and 3.565 seconds. While this current 
peak is clearly different from those around it, a detailed analysis of differences in 
characteristics between the peaks is not readily accessible. By contrast, Figure 39 shows 
the same period of data after processing through the phasor differencing algorithms. In 
this graph, the nature of the transient condition can be clearly identified and studied. 
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Figure 38: Half-cycle arc burst, unprocessed current waveforms 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Half-cycle arc burst, phasor differenced current waveforms 
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While the case presented above shows a relatively short, low magnitude 
transient, even cases with larger magnitudes and longer durations are difficult to 
adequately characterize without load current removed, as shown in Figure 40 and  
Figure 41. While Figure 40 contains clear transient activity, it is unclear exactly what is 
happening on a subcycle basis without the removal of the pre-event load. Figure 41, by 
contrast, shows the interaction between all phases much more clearly. 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Multi-cycle three-phase arc fault, unprocessed current waveforms 
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Figure 41: Multi-cycle three-phase arcing fault, phasor differenced current waveforms 
 
 
 
6.2 Typical Arcing Fault Waveforms 
 6.2.1 Single-phase Arcing Events 
Single-phase arcing events represent the majority of arcing transients on 
120/208V secondary networks. It is not inaccurate to say that sporadic, half cycle, 
single-phase arc bursts similar to those in Figure 38 and Figure 39 occur multiple times 
daily on the secondary network regardless of weather conditions.  
Bursts which persist for longer periods of time, however, exhibit general 
characteristics predicted by mathematical arcing fault models and resembling arcing 
fault waveforms observed on medium voltage class systems[10, 11, 83]. Figure 42 and 
Figure 43 show typical behavior during an extended arc burst period for a single-phase 
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arc. Figure 44 shows similar behavior on a medium voltage 12kV class system, recorded 
as part of Texas A&M’s ongoing DFA project on distribution feeders.  
 
 
 
Figure 42: Multi-cycle single-phase arc burst, voltage and differenced current 
waveforms 
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Figure 43: Full-cycle single-phase arc burst, voltage and differenced current waveforms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: 1.5 cycle medium-voltage single-phase arc burst, voltage and differenced 
current waveforms  
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6.2.2 Phase-to-phase Arcing Events 
As previously discussed, phase-to-phase arcing events are considered unusual on 
higher voltage class systems. As a result, very few recordings exist of phase-to-phase 
arcing. Figure 45 shows a typical phase-to-phase arcing burst observed during the course 
of this research. Figure 46 and Figure 47 show each individual faulted phase along with 
its phase voltage. As can be seen in both individual phase plots, the arcing fault currents 
in a phase-to-phase arcing fault maintain some characteristics of single-phase arcing, but 
the previously straightforward relationship between voltage and current no longer holds. 
In contrast, the arcing current in this example is driven by the difference in phase 
voltages, rather than the individual voltages themselves. Current waveforms do still 
exhibit significant nonlinearities, and clearly contain significant harmonic and non-
harmonic components. Events of this type are, in general, the simplest recorded phase-
to-phase cases. 
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Figure 45: Phase-to-phase arcing fault, phasor difference currents  
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Phase-to-phase arcing fault, voltage and differenced current, Phase A 
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Figure 47: Phase-to-phase arcing fault, voltage and differenced current, Phase C 
 
 
Figure 48 shows a case which contains phase-to-phase arcing involvement, but also 
involves system neutral. In practice, any given fault can, and often does, evolve between 
multiple electrical configurations in a span of cycles to seconds, transitioning between 
single-phase, phase-to-phase with no neutral involvement, phase-to-phase with neutral 
involvement, individual phases involved independently with system neutral, and a 
variety of complicated three-phase interactions.  
This fact owes to the highly unstable mechanical conditions generally present at 
the fault point. Electrical behavior of arcing faults is dominated by the contact 
impedance at the fault point. Changing mechanical conditions are easily imagined in a 
conduit with multiple exposed phase cables, each being subjected to strong mechanical 
forces produced by rapidly changing electric and magnetic fields. Ionized gasses, arc 
plasma, expelled gaseous metal, the mechanical action of the arc itself, progressive 
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physical damage, as well as whatever water, mud, sludge, and other conductive media 
that may exist in the conduit at the fault point, all contribute to this mechanical 
instability. As a result, developing any kind of model to predict the behavior of an 
underground arcing fault once it begins is not straightforward.  
 
 
 
Figure 48: Phase-to-phase fault with ground involvement, differenced currents 
 
 
 6.2.3 Three-phase Arcing Events 
As discussed in the previous section, attempting to predict the behavior of arcing 
faults by modeling is perilous once multiple phases are involved. Arcing where all three-
phases are involved within a relatively short temporal window is not uncommon, 
particularly in the final stages of an event. What is considerably more difficult, however, 
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is describing exactly which phases are involved with which other phases. This is again 
caused by the complicated, uncertain, and possibly continually changing conditions at 
the fault point, and further complicated by induced, sympathetic currents on non-faulted 
phases. Figure 49 shows a sample of relatively straightforward three-phase interactions. 
Even in this relatively simple case, phase currents display erratic and unusual behavior 
as arcing transitions between phases.  Figure 50 shows the same data, but with only 
Phase C plotted. In particular, the “notch” observable between 1.18 and 1.19 seconds is 
an unusual phenomenon not observed in single-phase or phase-to-phase arcing. 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Three-phase arcing fault 
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Figure 50: Three-phase arcing event, Phase C shown 
 
 
 
In Section 4.4.2.1 it was mentioned that large three-phase events could have a 
noticeable effect on system voltage, but that significant current levels were required for 
this to be observed. Figure 51 shows the RMS currents from a waveform file containing 
an arcing fault. While this fault produced RMS currents of over 2,500A, it reduced the 
phase voltage only by approximately 4V RMS, as observed in Figure 52. This represents 
a change of less than three percent out of the 126V RMS initial signal. It is debatable 
whether this three percent change in voltage would even be visible in the form of 
flickering lights. Arcing associated with this event eventually caused a report of a 
manhole event less than one block from the structure which observed these currents.  
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Figure 51: Arcing fault burst, RMS currents 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Arcing fault burst, RMS voltages 
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6.3 Variations Between Simultaneous Captures Observed at Multiple Locations 
On the afternoon of January 21, 2011, four underground DCD’s recorded a 
simultaneous arcing fault. This arcing activity, as well as additional bursts captured in 
the surrounding time period, resulted in a manhole event. Figure 53 shows the location 
of underground monitors which observed the event in green and the location of the 
faulted structure in red. The maximum point of estimated peak current is shown below 
the vault number in red text. Figure 54-Figure 57 show waveform recordings of the 
arcing fault as observed in multiple locations. 
 
 
 
Figure 53: Location of structures observing manhole event, faulted structure in red 
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Figure 54: Three-phase arcing fault, V8292 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: Three-phase arcing fault, V9698  
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Figure 56: Three-phase arcing fault, V7926 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57: Three-phase arcing fault, V9742 
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Multiple conclusions are clear from close inspection of the graphs. First, the 
general structure of the arcing fault is more or less unchanged from structure to structure 
for this particular fault. However, certain subcycle waveshape differences are clearly 
apparent. For example, the positive peak behavior of Phase C differs significantly 
between observations at V7926 and V9742, seen in Figure 56 and Figure 57 
respectively. Additionally, the relative magnitudes of fault current between phases is not 
consistent between faulted locations. Note that at all locations except V9742, Phase B 
current exceeds Phase C current, while at V9742 the opposite is true. More study 
remains to be done, but this is believed to be caused by out of service cables in the 
vicinity of one or more devices, either through intentional utility operation or 
unintentional damage caused by previous, yet undiscovered faulted conditions. 
Figure 58-Figure 65 serve to further illustrate this point. Figure 58 and Figure 59 
show all three fault current waveforms for an event observed at two locations, V7755 
and V3544, on August 14, 2010. The next six figures show individual phase currents for 
each phase measured at V7755 and V3544 respectively. For this event, investigation of 
the individual phases shows that, with very few exceptions, the signals agree quite 
closely in waveshape. The relative magnitudes, however, vary considerably. Phase A 
maintains a fairly consistent ratio of approximately 1:1 between locations throughout the 
capture file. For Phase B, measurements at V3544 are larger than measurements at 
V7755, on the order of 30%. In contrast, Phase C measurements at V3544 are almost 
100% greater than Phase C measurements at V7755. These measurements suggest that 
network topology can significantly affect localized fault current flows. 
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Figure 58: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V7755 
 
 
 
Figure 59: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V3544 
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Figure 60: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V7755, Phase A 
 
 
 
Figure 61: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V3544, Phase A 
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Figure 62: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V7755, Phase B 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V3544, Phase B 
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Figure 64: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V7755, Phase C 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65: Three-phase arcing fault observed at V3544, Phase C 
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While the event detailed in Figure 58-Figure 65 maintained a generally constant 
ratio of currents between the monitored points as the event progressed, this is not always 
the case. Figure 66 and Figure 67 show an arcing fault simultaneously recorded at two 
locations, V8442 and V9742. During the course of the event, current waveforms at 
V8442 drop off significantly, with current peaks near the end of the event approaching 
25% of those near the event’s inception. By contrast, the measurements taken at V9742 
show arc current increasing near the end of the event, in the case of Phase C to levels 
significantly higher than observed at the beginning of the event. It is incidental, but 
interesting to note that the maximum current observed at V9742, even near the end of 
the event remains smaller than the smallest currents observed at V8442. As discussed in 
Section 6.2, the most likely cause of these changes is variable mechanical conditions 
near the fault point fundamentally altering the observed impedance between source and 
fault. As cables are damaged by the fault, it is conceivable that the mechanical condition 
could be altered differently on either “side” of the fault. As damage continues to 
progress, the fault impedance might rise or fall depending on mechanical conditions at 
the faulted point. Without knowing the precise mechanical conditions at the point of the 
fault, all detailed hypotheses about relative fault current ratios remain little more than 
speculation. 
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Figure 66: Three-phase arcing fault, V8442 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67: Three-phase arcing fault, V9742 
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6.4 Persistence and Duration 
One major finding observed multiple times in the course of this project involves 
the length of time arcing bursts can persist near-continuously without self-extinguishing 
or causing enough damage to be reported through conventional means. In contrast to 
conventional wisdom claims that arcing faults on 120/208V networks do not sustain 
themselves for any significant amount of time, researchers documented multiple 
instances where arcing persisted at monitored locations for hours. Figure 68 shows a 
sixty-second portion of one such arc burst, which continued unabated for four-hours 
before utility crews located and repaired the underlying problem. In some instances, 
these faults produced high fault currents, with the combined total of fault current at all 
monitored locations measuring thousands of amperes. While many of these events are 
eventually reported as manhole events, some eventually self-extinguish, though 
potentially remain incipient conditions.  
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Figure 68: Sixty seconds of arcing activity 
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7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Overview 
The research presented in this dissertation fundamentally alters the landscape of 
knowledge about arcing faults on 120/208V networks. Before this investigation, the 
behavior of arcing faults on 120/208V networks was a poorly understood phenomenon, 
and virtually no high-fidelity data existed of naturally occurring arcing faults on an 
operational system. Beliefs about arcing at 120/208V were largely dominated by 
conventional wisdom claims, with few statements based on scientific measurements. In 
contrast, this research has produced an expansive database of arcing fault waveforms, 
believed to be the most extensive such database currently in existence.  
7.2 Proof of Hypothesis 
With regard to the hypotheses and research goals set forth in this study, the 
results of this project have exceeded expectations. Selected case studies are presented in 
Section 8, which serve as representative of the results documented during this course of 
research. These selected cases, as well as others, provide sufficient evidence of the 
following: 
1) Arcing faults can persist for minutes, hours, days, or weeks before producing 
enough physical or electrical evidence to be detected by a utility company or 
the public. This finding is substantiated by multiple cases, including those 
presented in Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix D. 
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2) Arcing faults at 120V can persist near-continuously for hours without self-
extinguishing or operating any protective device. Cases studies presented in 
Appendix A and Appendix B show clear examples of this behavior. 
3) Arcing faults on low-voltage secondary networks can be detected by 
monitoring primary feeders serving network transformers geographically 
proximate to the faulted location. One such case is detailed in Appendix 
Appendix C. 
4) Arcing faults can be readily detected by electrically monitoring secondary 
cables; both low and high current faults can be detected. All cases studes 
presented in Appendix A-Appendix E show a diversity of arcing behavior, 
including both high and low current faults. 
5) Arcing fault current is served predominantly by network transformers closest 
to the fault location. Appendix E shows a current distribution observed by 
multiple units, substantiating this finding. 
6) Monitors not electrically near the fault location do not observe the fault. All 
studied cases where the actual fault location is known confirm that monitors 
which are not electrically proximate to the fault do not observe the event. 
7) Faults can be located using multiple, simultaneous measurements of fault 
current on secondary cables. Case studies presented in Appendix D and 
Appendix E show that, in some cases, arcing faults can be located based on 
multiple, simultaneous measurements of fault current on secondary cables. 
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7.3 Additional Research 
Considerable work remains before arcing on low-voltage networks will be 
fundamentally understood as well as arcing faults at higher voltages. In particular, 
additional studies are needed with a greater density of monitored points on multiple 
utility’s networks to ensure the conclusions set forth in this research, primarily drawn 
from the ConEdison system, can be generalized to all low-voltage networks. 
Investigation is needed in detecting secondary network arcing from primary feeder 
measurement points, with the potential to achieve maximum network coverage while 
substantially reducing the number of data collection devices required. On the secondary 
network, additional study is needed to understand how many network monitors would be 
required to enable reliable fault location, and where to place those monitors for 
maximum effectiveness. A study applying similar methods to 480V networks would 
explore the now-existing gap in understanding between 120V and 480V arcing. 
In summary, this research provides a foundational, scientific basis for future 
research to detect, locate, and possibly prevent arcing faults on low-voltage secondary 
networks. It is hoped that this and future work will have a serious impact on mitigating 
arcing faults on 120/208V networks, reducing the safety hazards they produce and 
thereby improving network reliability. 
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY 1 - NETWORK ARCING FAULT OBSERVED AT 
TWO UNDERGROUND LOCATIONS LEADS TO MANHOLE EVENT 
 
A.1 Summary 
On the evening of August 14, 2010, two proximate underground DCDs recorded 
simultaneous arcing signatures with high magnitude. High magnitude arcing signatures 
generally result when an event is particularly severe, or when the monitoring device is 
sufficiently close to the faulted point. Arcing continued violently at the monitored 
location over an eight minute period. This arcing activity resulted in the report of a 
manhole event to ConEdison, located approximately half a block from each DCD. 
A.2 Detailed narrative 
This event was selected for presentation as a case study for multiple reasons. 
First, high-speed waveforms from this arcing event were used multiple times in the main 
body of this dissertation, as they provide excellent examples of high magnitude, three-
phase arcing. The inclusion of these high-speed waveforms at other points in the 
presentation allows this narrative to focus on the behavior of the event as a whole, as 
opposed to focusing on specific details of waveforms. Discussion of high-speed 
waveforms related to this event can be found in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3. Second, the 
entire event lasted only eight minutes, and resulted in fewer than one hundred total 
waveform files, compared to other major arcing episodes, which may generate several 
hundred waveform files over many hours. The shorter time duration and lower number 
of files allows a higher percentage of important data to be presented in this case study, 
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allowing easier diagnosis of high level trends. Finally, it represents a clear case where 
multiple transformers observed significant currents, with waveform peaks of well over 
3,000A, and RMS fault currents of several hundred amperes. 
Figure 69 shows a street map of the neighborhood local to this event. V7755 and 
V3544 are located approximately one electrical block from each other, but on two 
separate streets. The arcing fault occurred at the intersection of Hester and Bowery, 
located approximately at the midpoint of the two locations. 
 
 
 
Figure 69: Street map showing locations of V7755, V3544, and resultant manhole event 
 
 
Because several high-speed waveforms from this event are used in the main body 
of this dissertation, graphs presented in this case study will focus on RMS signals 
calculated from the calculated phasor differenced quantities. These graphs represent the 
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best estimate of the RMS of the fault current at each location. It is important to note that 
this is not the RMS cycle-to-cycle difference parameter used for triggering, which is 
calculated by the unit from a simple point-by-point subtraction and is used only for the 
purposes of triggering waveform files. Instead, the graphs presented in Section 0 account 
for both phase shifts and harmonic content in the load and event signals. As one final 
note, because arcing faults are not steady-state sinusoidal signals, the RMS values 
calculated do not have a simple “square root 2” relationship with peak current values. 
For each of the waveforms presented below, peak values substantially exceed those 
expected by a square root 2 approximation. 
 Figure 70 and Figure 71 show the initial major burst recorded in this event. The 
event begins entirely on Phase A, but quickly progresses to involve Phase C and system 
neutral as well. Following the burst in Figure 70 and Figure 71, sporadic half cycle 
arcing continued on Phase B for the next minute and a half, which eventually resulted in 
a brief, eight cycle burst which involved all three-phases at 17:51.  
Sporadic Phase B arcing continued for the next minute with greater persistence 
before resulting in the bursts seen in Figure 72 and Figure 73. In these graphs, low level 
Phase B arcing activity can be seen in the initial second, followed by a brief, half-cycle 
phase-to-phase arc burst on Phases A and B, which immediately transitions into a 
significant, three-phase burst. Contrasting Figure 70 and Figure 71 with Figure 72 and 
Figure 73, we can already see a shift in the relative magnitudes of the phase. In Figure 
70 and Figure 71, both V3544 and V7755 share roughly the same ratio of C to A current, 
with the magnitude of Phase C being approximately 33% larger than the magnitude of 
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Phase A. In Figure 72, by contrast, Phase C is 43% larger than Phase A, while in Figure 
73, Phase C is only 20% larger than Phase A.  
Low level arcing continued for the next twenty seconds before producing the 
graphs shown in Figure 74 and Figure 75. High-speed waveforms from this current burst 
were discussed extensively in Section 6.3, and extended discussion will not be repeated 
here.  
For the next minute and a half, arcing continued primarily on Phase B, but with 
occasional involvement on Phase A and Phase C. Arcing peaks in these bursts 
consistently reached over 1,500 amperes, with some peaks reaching greater than 2,000 
amperes.  
At 17:54, three-phase arcing resumed, as seen in Figure 76 and Figure 77. This 
was followed quickly by phase-to-phase bursts shown in Figure 78 and Figure 79. Lower 
level single-phase arcing was observed on Phase B for the next two minutes. While this 
could be considered a sort of quiescent period, arc bursts continued to have peak 
magnitudes of over 800A. After the two minute quiescent period, arcing resumed with 
the bursts shown in Figure 80 and Figure 81. Three additional phase-to-phase and three-
phase bursts occurred over the next minute and a half, but none differ significantly from 
graphs already presented. The final observed bursts are shown in Figure 82 and Figure 
83.  
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this series of waveforms. First, 
secondary network arcing faults can evolve in unpredictable ways, transitioning between 
single-phase, phase-to-phase, and three-phase involvement, sometimes in a span of a few 
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cycles. Second, mechanical changes at the fault point can result in significant changes to 
the ratios between phase magnitudes observed at various locations during the course of 
an event. Finally, there is not a certain correlation between the duration of a burst and a 
report of a manhole event. This event was over in eight minutes, yet generated a report 
of a manhole fire, while similar bursts have continued for hours with no such report.  
 
A.3 Waveforms 
 
 
 
Figure 70: Initial burst, V3544, 17:50 
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Figure 71: Initial burst, V7755, 17:50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 72: Three-phase burst, V3544, 17:52 
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Figure 73: Three-phase burst, V7755, 17:52 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74: Major three-phase burst, V3544, 17:53 
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Figure 75: Major three-phase burst, V7755, 17:53 
 
 
 
 
Figure 76: Three-phase burst, V3544, 17:54 
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Figure 77: Three-phase burst, V7755, 17:54 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 78: Phase-to-phase burst, V3544, 17:54 
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Figure 79: Phase-to-phase burst, V7755, 17:54 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 80: Phase-to-phase burst, V3544, 17:57 
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Figure 81: Phase-to-phase burst, V7755, 17:57 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 82: Final burst, V3544, 17:58 
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Figure 83: Final burst, V7755, 17:58 
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY 2 - NETWORK ARCING FAULT PERSISTS NEAR-
CONTINUOUSLY FOR 72 HOURS 
 
B.1 Summary 
Over a 72 hour period from December 30, 2010 to the early morning hours of 
January 2, 2011, a single DCD located at V4413 recorded over 2,000 separate waveform 
captures containing arcing-related signatures. While arcing did not persist on a 
continuous basis, at least one arcing burst with RMS current greater than 500A was 
recorded for the majority of intervals recorded during this period. No manhole event was 
reported as a result of this activity. This case represents the longest period of time over 
which arcing was observed on a consistent basis at the same location without self-
extinguishing, or generating enough evidence to be reported to ConEdison.  
B.2 Detailed narrative 
On December 26 and 27, 2010, New York City received a cumulative 20 inches 
of snowfall. Temperatures remained below freezing until December 30, when the high 
reached 40 F. Temperatures remained above freezing for all of December 31, when the 
recorded low was 36 F. Higher temperatures combined with record snowfalls resulted in 
abnormally high snow runoff, a condition believed to be closely tied with arcing activity 
underground. 
On the morning of December 30, the DCD installed at V4413 began to observe 
significant numbers of arcing transients. Initially, the transients were primarily half-
cycle and single-phase or phase-to-phase, though occurring once every few minutes, 
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with some minutes having multiple bursts. Figure 84 shows a representative example of 
these early waveforms. By midday on the 30th, the frequency and intensity of the bursts 
had increased. Due to the rate at which captures were generated, waveform files from 
10:41 on December 30 to December 31 at 7:26 were not retrieved. A total of 2063 
waveform captures were triggered over the three day period. All capture files retrieved 
contained arcing signatures. 
Interval data from this period suggests arcing continued on a persistent basis for 
virtually the entire three day period. Figure 85 shows a plot of interval data collected 
over an 8 day period beginning at midnight on December 28. Data on this plot represents 
the maximum value of differenced current recorded over fifteen minute intervals. Of 289 
interval data points observed between midnight on December 30 and 01:00 on January 2, 
240 contained at least one major arcing signature, a rate of 83%.   
Figure 86-Figure 91show typical waveforms captured during this period. While 
the majority of bursts lasted only a few cycles, they did show significant fault current 
magnitudes, with peaks reaching over 1,000A. The final burst, shown in Figure 91, 
represents much more sustained arcing activity. In spite of the significant arcing activity 
over an extended period of time, no manhole events were reported in the area. 
This case represents one of multiple instances where arcing was recorded on a 
consistent basis over a period of many hours without the fault self-extinguishing or 
generating enough evidence to be detected by conventional means. This finding is 
contrary to conventional wisdom claims that arcing faults quickly burn clear in 
120/208V networks. 
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B.3 Waveforms 
 
 
Figure 84: Early arc burst, 12/30 03:53 
 
 
 
Figure 85: Interval data of maximum recorded differenced current, 12/28/2010-
1/04/2011 
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Figure 86: Multi-phase burst, 12/31 07:37 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 87: Three-phase burst, 1/1/2011 15:06 
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Figure 88: Three-phase burst, 1/1/2011 15:16 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 89: Three-phase burst, 1/1/2011 20:21 
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Figure 90: Three-phase burst, 1/1/2011 20:33 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 91: Three-phase extended burst, 1/2/2011 00:34 
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 Figure 92: Timeline for Case Study 8.3
APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY 3 - SECONDARY NETWORK ARCING FAULT 
OBSERVED ON PRIMARY FEEDER 
 
C.1 Summary 
On the evening of November 30, 2009, two underground DCDs and a DCD 
monitoring a primary feeder serving the Cooper Square network simultaneously 
recorded a secondary network arcing fault. Fault activity continued over a period of 
seven hours. Following a fifteen-hour quiescent period, arcing resumed the following 
evening. During a four-hour period on the evening of December 1, 2009, three 
underground DCDs and the substation monitor recorded simultaneous arcing 
measurements. A timeline of events is contained in Figure 92. This is believed to be the 
first time secondary network arcing has been simultaneously measured on the secondary 
network and a primary feeder serving the network. 
 
C.2 Detailed narrative 
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At approximately 21:00 on the evening of November 30, 2009, two underground 
DCDs and a DCD at the Ave. A. Area substation recorded substantial arcing signatures. 
Arcing continued intermittently at all three locations for the next seven hours. By 
chance, researchers noticed the activity on the evening of November 30, and reported it 
to ConEdison less than three hours after it began. The following morning, a search of 
outage tickets showed no report of a manhole event associated with arcing on the 
evening of November 30, or the morning of December 1. 
At 18:54 on the evening of December 1, arcing resumed at all three installations 
which had observed arcing the previous evening, and was also detected at a third 
underground monitor. At 19:25, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) reported two 
adjacent smoking manholes in the vicinity of the three underground monitors. All four 
monitors continued to observe significant arcing over the next four-hours, before crews 
were able to isolate the problem and cut the affected mains. 
 Figure 93-Figure 96 show waveforms recorded during the four-hour portion of 
near-continuous arcing observed on the night of December 1. Figure 93-Figure 95 show 
measurements recorded at underground locations, while Figure 96 shows the same 
recording as viewed from the primary. Figure 97-Figure 100 show a zoomed portion of 
the same waveforms.  
There are several points of interest regarding these waveforms. First, secondary 
network arcing activity is clearly seen on the primary feeder. Once the transformer’s 
turns ratio has been accounted for, the primary feeder is sourcing over 1,000A to the 
145 
 
 
fault on the secondary, in addition to the current coming from the three underground 
monitors, none of which are served by this feeder. Second, there is not a 1:1 
correspondence in waveforms between primary and secondary measurements, which is 
expected since the primary monitor is viewing the fault from the delta side of a delta-
wye transformer, and the fault is on the wye side. In more simple fault cases, predicting 
primary side fault behavior is relatively straightforward. For instance, a single-phase 
fault occurring on the secondary produces a phase-to-phase fault when seen on the other 
side of a delta-wye transformer. Once the fault becomes more complicated and involves 
several phases, however, such predictions become much more difficult.  
The conclusion that secondary network arcing can be observed from primary 
feeders serving the network was a surprising finding for many engineers. Before these 
recordings, it was generally believed that arcing fault currents would be too small to be 
seen at the area substation. This finding does lay the possible foundation for a system 
which could be installed on primary feeders and used to detect arcing in underground 
structures.  
Such a system would have numerous practical benefits over a system installed on 
the secondary. One obvious advantage would be a substantially reduced number of 
monitoring points. Most primary feeders on a network serve on the order of 10 
transformers, implying a primary feeder-based system would only need 10% of the 
points for the same amount of coverage. Additionally, substation installations do not 
need to be field hardened to the same extent as devices intended to operate underground. 
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Most substations also have communication of some sort, while communication to 
underground devices is extremely challenging.  
Significantly more research is needed before a substation-based system capable 
of detecting and locating arcing faults is a practical reality, but these recordings, as well 
as hundreds of others obtained from primary feeder measurements during this project, 
suggest the viability of such a system. 
 
C.3 Waveforms 
 
 
Figure 93: Simultaneous arcing fault, V8106 (secondary) 
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Figure 94: Simultaneous arcing fault, V4413 (secondary) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 95: Simultaneous arcing fault, V9216 (secondary) 
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Figure 96: Simultaneous arcing fault, Ave. A. 7M54 (primary) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 97: Simultaneous arcing fault, zoomed, V8106 (secondary) 
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Figure 98: Simultaneous arcing fault, zoomed, V4413 (secondary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 99: Simultaneous arcing fault, zoomed, V9216 (secondary) 
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Figure 100: Simultaneous arcing fault, zoomed, Ave. A 7M54 (primary) 
 
151 
 
 
APPENDIX D: CASE STUDY 4 - ARCING FAULT PERSISTS FOR THREE WEEKS 
BEFORE BEING LOCATED 
 
D.1 Summary 
On March 13, 2010, two DCDs recorded significant arcing bursts. These bursts 
continued sporadically over the next 18 days. ConEdison was informed of the arcing 
activity on March 23. Acting on measurements obtained from the DCDs, ConEdison was 
able to use internal tools to locate the fault and make repairs. No further arcing episodes 
were observed, suggesting the problem was fixed. 
D.2 Detailed narrative 
On the morning of March 13, 2010, two underground DCDs recorded multiple 
three-phase arcing bursts. This arcing continued over a period of almost seven hours, 
with a two hour quiescent period in the middle. Over the next 21 hours, both data 
collection devices continued to record arcing-related signatures, with alternating periods 
of arcing and quiescence measured in hours. 
Figure 101 shows the initial burst, as observed at one of the units. Figure 102 
shows an additional burst captured 16 hours after the original observation. Figure 103 
shows a burst captured 28 hours after the initial observation. Following the activity 
shown in Figure 103, no activity was observed at either unit for a period of five days. 
Additional episodes were observed on March 19, March 23, March 29, and March 30. 
Figure 104 shows a plot of arcing observed 16 days after the initial burst. On March 23, 
ConEdison was informed of the arcing activity. On March 25, based on information 
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obtained from DCD measurements, ConEdison dispatched trucks designed to detect 
elevated voltages on structures to the area proximate to the two DCSs. On March 31, 
after several nights of searching, one truck found multiple energized structures half a 
block from the two data collection devices. A crew was dispatched the next morning and 
found significant damage to mains in proximate structures. Following repairs, no 
additional arcing was detected, and the problem was considered to be resolved. 
The plot in Figure 105 shows interval data collected from this DCD between 
March 13 and April 1, 2010. The plot represents the maximum value of cycle-to-cycle 
differenced current that was recorded in each 15 minute interval over this time period. In 
the graph, clear periods of activity are spaced with long periods of quiescence.  
This case represents clearly that in some cases, arcing faults can continue over a 
period of weeks in an incipient condition without self-extinguishing. While there is no 
way to know how long the incipient fault would have persisted without utility action, it 
can be certain that, at least for a period of 18 days, the fault persisted in an incipient 
condition that had neither fully self-extinguished, nor generated any evidence to indicate 
there was a problem. This represents a clear contradiction to what most utility engineers 
perceive to be conventional wisdom. In short, arcing faults can, and many times do 
persist over days or weeks before causing a final failure. 
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D.3 Waveforms 
 
Figure 101: Initial observed arc burst 
 
 
 
 
Figure 102: Additional arcing, observed 16 hours after original burst 
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Figure 103: Additional arcing, observed 28 hours after initial burst 
 
 
 
 
Figure 104: Additional arcing, observed 16 days after initial burst. 
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Figure 105: Plot of maximum transient currents observed during 15 minute 
intervals, March 13-April1, 2010 
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APPENDIX E: CASE STUDY 5 - ARCING FAULT OBSERVED AT FIVE 
UNDERGROUND LOCATIONS 
 
E.1 Summary 
On the evening of January 12, 2011, five proximate DCDs simultaneously 
recorded current from an arcing fault. Damaged cables from this fault then lay dormant 
for the next four months, resulting in an incipient condition and creating the potential for 
a future manhole event. Based on measurements obtained during this arcing fault, 
researchers used ConEdison’s Poly-Voltage Loadflow (PVL) software to predict the 
structure most likely to contain the incipient event. A crew inspected the structure and 
found multiple burned out cables. Repairs were completed, avoiding future 
consequences. 
E.2 Detailed narrative 
On the evening of January 12, 2011, five proximate DCDs recorded a phase-to-
phase arcing fault on the Cooper Square network. This represented the first time an event 
was observed simultaneously by five underground monitors. Because so many monitors 
observed the event, it provided an excellent test-case to explore how arcing fault currents 
distribute themselves around the network, and in particular how well real data matched 
modeling software used by ConEdison.  
Figure 106 shows the locations of the five DCDs which observed the event, as 
well as the maximum peak fault current magnitudes observed at each location. Figure 
107-Figure 111 show the actual recorded arcing waveforms for each of the five 
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locations. When the project began, there was a large degree of uncertainty about how far 
fault currents might travel across the network. Over the course of the project, researchers 
began to feel that a unit needed to be relatively “close” to an event to see any substantial 
fault current. Readings from this event would allow researchers to quantify that, if the 
location of the faulted structure could be found. 
 
 
 
Figure 106: Locations of DCDs and fault currents observed 
 
 
ConEdison provided researchers with access and training for their Poly-Voltage 
Loadflow program (PVL). PVL is an internal tool developed by ConEdison which 
performs a variety of functions, including allowing the user to simulate a bolted, three-
phase fault at any structure on the network and calculate an expected fault current at 
every structure due to that fault. Arcing faults have a finite impedance and, by definition, 
158 
 
 
are not bolted faults. Many arcing faults, including this one, are also not three-phase 
events. As a result, it was expected that PVL estimates for fault current would be 
substantially greater than readings produced by the DCDs. However, it was hoped the 
relative magnitudes predicted by PVL would match the values observed by the DCDs. 
Because the current observed at V9742 was extremely high, researchers began by 
running PVL simulations for faults in structures proximate to V9742. The first structure 
run was M53933, a structure adjacent to V9742, and the resulting current distribution fit 
reasonably well with observed values. A ConEdison crew was dispatched to the structure 
to check for damage, but found none. Following this, researchers ran PVL simulations at 
ten underground structures near V9742 and developed multiple error functions to 
quantify the structure with the best fit. Of the ten structures tested SB53931, SB53930, 
and M53933 consistently had the lowest error values.   
Table 5 shows error values for the five underground structures with the lowest 
overall absolute error. Cells shaded red represent the highest error values on a per row 
basis, where cells shaded blue represent the lowest error values. SB53931 consistently 
showed the lowest error values across all functions tested. Based on these results, 
ConEdison dispatched a crew to SB53931 to inspect the structure for damage. The crew 
found multiple burned out cables, and made the appropriate repairs.   
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Table 5: Error values for PVL simulation 
Error Function M53934 M53933 53926 53931 53930 
Percentage Difference 0.805 0.891 0.905 0.475 0.742 
Weighted % Difference 0.046 0.050 0.052 0.021 0.039 
Ratio Difference 0.073 0.042 0.087 0.021 0.057 
Ratio Percentage Difference 1.258 0.726 1.518 0.477 1.140 
Weighted Ratio % Difference 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.003 
 
 
E.3 Waveforms 
 
 
Figure 107: Arcing burst, V9742 
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Figure 108: Arcing burst, V8442 
 
 
Figure 109: Arcing burst, V8292 
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Figure 110: Arcing burst, V7926 
 
Figure 111: Arcing burst, V4238 
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